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ABSTRACT. Previous literature suggests that classified boards of directors could impact firm
performance in the context of firm-specific characteristics. In continuation of this discussion,
this study investigates the effect of classified boards on firm value in the restaurant industry.
Even though classified boards can reduce firm value because of higher monitoring costs,
existing literature argues that classified boards are devoted to protecting investors and
shareholders against opportunistic bids, which in turn increases their debt financing
capabilities. Data from U.S. restaurant firms was analyzed by Compustat and RiskMetrics
from 2007 – 2011 to investigate whether classified boards impact firm value in the restaurant
industry. Our results indicate that classified boards of directors lower the value destruction of
restaurant firms in terms of cost of debt. That is, cost of debt is lower in classified board firms,
thereby reducing their negative impact on firm value. The implications and limitation of this
research are also discussed.

directors in the retailing industry context.
Anderson and Fraser (2000) also investigated
the role of the board of directors on decisionmaking in the banking industry. Moreover,
Mayers, Shivdasani, and Smith (1997) identified the role of the board of directors for
insurance firms. However, limited research has
been undertaken in the hospitality industry
context. Within the hospitality industry, the
food service industry represents the largest scale
of activity measured by sales. According to the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (2010), the U.S.
food service industry accounts for approximately $800 billion of sales in 2009. In this
large market, a number of restaurant firms are
under competitive pressure, and firms are
struggling to enhance their value. In this
process, the role of the board of directors is
critical, given that shareholders do not always
see eye to eye with the management. Recently,
shareholders in the McDonald’s corporation
claimed that declassification of the board
would enhance the value of shares. However,
the McDonald’s corporation declined the
request, emphasizing the importance of board

INTRODUCTION
In corporations, shareholders hire directors,
and the directors hire managers (Chatfield &
Dalbor, 2005; Core, Guay, & Rusticus, 2006).
The purpose of the board of directors is to
manage firms for the maximization of shareholders’ wealth (Bates, Betcher, & Lemmon,
2008; La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, &
Vishny, 2002). Generally, the board of directors
is elected annually; however, certain firms do
not elect their board of directors on an annual
basis (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003;
Harford, Li, & Zhao, 2008). Board classification
refers to a continuing structure of direction for a
certain portion of the directors by their unique
classification (Falaye, 2007; Sundaramurthy,
Mahoney, & Mahoney, 1997). Bebchuk,
Cohen, and Farrell (2009) also noted that
board classification is a staggered election
structure of corporate governance, which
could cause entrenchment.
A vast body of literature investigates the role
of board classification in various contexts. For
example, Chaganti, Mahajan, and Sharma
(1985) examined the role of the board of
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stability and continuity to ensure knowledge of
McDonald’s management system, which
enables the firm to achieve ongoing success
and create share value (McDonald’s corporation, 2011).
Falaye (2007) verified that classified boards
(also known as “staggered” boards) perform
differently by types of firms, although it is value
destroying in general. Obviously, restaurant
firms have their own characteristics. For
example, Guillet and Mattila (2010) note that
restaurant firms are labor and capital intensive,
have lower inventories compared to manufacturing firms, and have a high proportion of cost
of goods. Furthermore, restaurant firms are
represented by smaller firm size and higher
profitability, compared with other hospitality
industries (Inoue & Lee, 2011; Kang, Lee, &
Huh, 2010). Given restaurant firms’ unique
financial characteristics, it would be reasonable
to assume that a corporate board could have a
different influence on a firm’s value. However,
limited studies have been conducted to test
these effects of the board of directors in the
restaurant context, to determine whether they
impair the value of firms. Therefore, the
purpose of this study is to fill this gap in
governance literature of the restaurant industry.
By examining the effect of the classified board
of directors, this study contributes to further
understanding of the impact of restaurant firms’
financial characteristics.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Theoretical Foundation
Board classification is defined as a continuing structure of direction for a certain portion of
the directors by their unique classification
(Bebchuk et al., 2009; Falaye, 2007). Therefore, the board of directors is not annually
elected under the classified board, even though
the election of directors is a primary way for
shareholders to take part in a corporate event
(Bebchuk & Cohen, 2005; Chen, 2012).
Agency theory is widely used to build the
theoretical foundation of board classification.
The theory focuses on the relationship between
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shareholders and managers. Managers basically
own superior information compared to shareholders in order to manage the overall business
and to cope with uncertainties (Demsetz, 1983;
Dewenter & Warther, 1998; Faleye, 2009).
However, superior information allows managers the latitude to act for their own benefit
instead of shareholders’ wealth, which causes
conflict with shareholders (Jensen, 1986; Stulz,
1990). Shareholders, thus, are required to
monitor the manager, incurring costs for the
sake of monitoring and preventing inappropriate actions by managers (Agrawal & Mandelker,
1990; Inderst & Ottaviani, 2009; Jensen &
Meckling, 1976). Firms spend their resources
for the purpose of monitoring, which consequently affects the value of the firm (Hermalin
& Weisbach, 1998; Holmstrom, 1979; Sundaramurthy, Mahoney, & Mahoney, 1997).
Under board classification, the board of
directors can allow shareholders limited access
to information (Bates et al., 2008; Chen, 2012;
Harford, Mansi, & Maxwell, 2008). This limited
access to information gives rise to increased
uncertainty for shareholders and, therefore,
perceived riskier conditions (Ertimur, Ferri, &
Stubben, 2010; Huang, Lai, & Wen, 2008;
Jensen, 1986; Kusnadi, 2011). Hence, shareholders spend more resources on monitoring,
which diminishes the value of firms. Consequently, a classified board could hamper firm
value enhancement as a result of increased
monitoring costs.
Value Destruction Due to Classified
Board
Previous studies found that a classified
board is responsible for value destruction
(Frakes, 2007; Harford, Li, et al., 2008).
Scholars found that more difficulty in monitoring by the classified board accounts for
destruction of a firm’s value (John & Senbet,
1998; Chen, 2012). That is, a classified board is
less likely to maximize shareholders’ benefits.
Hence, board classification causes managerial
entrenchment, and the entrenched management could destroy firm value (Bates et al.,
2008). A vast body of literature addresses the
value-destroying feature of classified boards.
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For example, Falaye (2007) verifies that a
classified board is negatively related to a firm’s
value, measured by Tobin’s Q. Bebchuk and
Cohen (2005) and Brown and Caylor (2006)
also tested the effect of board classification and
they found that a classified board is value
destroying by using examples of the publicly
traded U.S. firms. Based on the prior empirical
and theoretical evidence, this study assumes
similar aspects of the classified board for
restaurant firms. Therefore, this study proposes
the following hypothesis:
H1: Classified boards lower the value of
restaurant firms.
Classified Board and Cost of Capital
Board classification leads to stability and
continuity of corporate governance because of
its continuing structure (Harford, Li, et al.,
2008). Stability enables classified boards to be
prepared for all the potential bids in the event
of a takeover (Ertugrul & Hedge, 2008). The
upsurge of defending capabilities against takeover deter the opportunistic bids, which
damages shareholders’ wealth (Bates et al.,
2008). Harford, Mansi, et al., (2008) also notes
that a classified board enhances debt-financing
capabilities because the board is more able to
resist opportunistic takeover. Enhanced
capacity of debt financing leads firms to protect
shareholders. Chen (2012) also notes that
shareholders are less concerned about hostile
takeover under a classified board, and the
reduced concern of shareholders facilitates
more debt financing. A classified board could
also reduce the cost of debt (Anderson, Mansi,
& Reeb, 2004; Fischer, Gramlich, Miller, &
White, 2009). Falaye (2007) also empirically
demonstrates the defensive capabilities of a
classified board against opportunistic bids, such
as “blank check preferred” and “poison pill.”
Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian (2002)
showed that classified-board-acquired firms
could not obtain a high premium, despite
successful bids. Hence, the enhanced capacity
against an opportunistic bid serves to reduce
financial risk and cost of debt (Bebchuk et al.,

2002; Ertugrul & Hedge, 2008; Jensen, 1986;
Myer, 1977). Given the abundant empirical
evidence, it is reasonably assumed that
restaurant firms could gain from enhanced
debt financing as a result of board classification.
Therefore, current research suggests the following hypothesis:
H2: Classified board lowers the cost of debt.

METHODS
Data and Research Variables
The restaurant firms’ financial data are
derived from COMPUSTAT, using standard
industry classification (SIC) code 5812. RiskMetrics was employed to acquire information of
classified boards. During the study period of
2007– 2011, twenty-four restaurant firms were
sampled. Cook’s distance was applied using a
threshold of 1 to detect outliers (Hair, Black,
Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2010). Two outliers
were eliminated from the sample based on the
results of Cook’s distance. The panel was formed
as an unbalanced panel. The total number of
observations was 118. Sampled firms are
illustrated in Table 1.
The dependent variable of this study was
Tobin’s Q, which has been used as a
representative measure of firm value in
previous restaurant studies (Hsu & Jang, 2009;
Koh, Lee, & Boo, 2009; Gompers et al., 2003;
TABLE 1. Sampled Restaurant Firms
Firm name (Ticker)

Firm name (Ticker)

Bob Evans Restaurant (BOBE)
Brinker International (EAT)
BJ’s Restaurants (BJRI)
Burger King (BK-C)

McDonald’s Corp (MCD)
O’Charley’s (CHUX)
Panera Bread (PNRA)
PAPA John’s International
(PZZA)
P F Chang’s China Bistro
(PFCB)
Red Robin (RRGB)
Ruby Tuesday (RT)
Sonic Drive-in (SONC)
Starbucks (SBUX)
Texas Roadhouse (TXRH)
Wendy’s Co (WEN)
YUM Brands (YUM)

Buffalo Wild Wings (BWLD)
CEC Entertainment (CEC)
Cheesecake Factory (CAKE)
CKE Restaurant (CKR)
Chipotle Mexican Grill (CMG)
Cracker Barrel (CBRL)
Darden Restaurants (DRI)
Jack In The Box (JACK)
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Tobin, 1969). Moreover, Falaye (2007) and
Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) also recommended
Tobin’s Q as an appropriate proxy of firm value
in their classified board study. The main
independent variables include return on assets
(ROA), firm size measured by total assets (SIZE),
financial leverage measured by debt ratio
(DEBT), and classified board (CB) measured in
binary format (1 ¼ classified board; 0 ¼
nonclassified board). Hsu and Jang (2009)
and Koh et al., (2009) also employed the firm
size, which is measured by total assets and
financial leverage, to predict the firm’s value
in the restaurant context. Table 2 provides the
variable definition and measurement.
Statistical Analysis
Natural log transformation was performed
on SIZE, DEBT, and Q to obtain heteroskedasticity-corrected standard error and
normality (Greene, 2006; Hair et al., 2009).
Variation inflation factor (VIF) was used to test
multicollinearity. According to Wooldridge
(2009), the estimation was less likely to be
impaired by the multicollinearity issue, if VIF is
less than 10. Therefore, the estimation was not
impaired by multicollinearity because overall
VIF records less than five. Panel regression
analysis was employed because the data are
formed as panel data. This study performed
the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier
test to identify the more appropriate model
between the random effect model and pooled
ordinary least squares (OLS) by comparing the
TABLE 2. Measurement of Variables
Variables

Description

Classified board (CB)

1 ¼ Classified board;
0 ¼ Nonclassified board
Total Assets
Net Income/Total Assets
Total Debt/Total Assets
(MVE þ PS þ LIAB)/TA

Firm Size (SIZE)
Return on Assets (ROA)
Leverage (DEBT)
Tobin’s Q (Q)

Note: MVE ¼ Market Value of Equity ¼ Share Price*
Number of Common Stock Outstanding; PS ¼ Preferred
Stock ¼ Book value of the firm’s preferred stock; LIAB ¼ Book
Value of Inventories þ Book Value of Long-term Debt - Shortterm Liability -Short-term Assets; and TA ¼ Total Assets ¼ Book
Value of Total Assets.
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residual between the pooled model and the
random effect model, which incorporated
unobserved effects into the model for the
purpose of minimizing the omitted variable
bias (Gujarati & Porter, 2009; Greene, 2006).
The test statistics of panel regression were not
significant (x2 ¼ 0.02; p ¼ 0.92). This indicates that the null hypothesis (H0:s1 ¼ 0) was
not rejected. Therefore, pooled OLS regression
was regarded as a more appropriate tool for
the analysis. The classified board (CB) is used
to test the first hypothesis, whereas the
interaction between CB and ln (DEBT) is
employed to test the second hypothesis. The
following is the equation of the suggested
regression analysis:
ln Q ¼ lnðSIZEÞ þ ROA þ lnðDEBTÞ þ CB
þ CB*lnðSIZEÞ þ CB*ROA
þ CB*lnðDEBTÞ þ 1
*****Poor model: Tobin’s Q will relate to
ROA.
(Note: Classified board (CB): 1 ¼ Classified
board; 0 ¼ Nonclassified board; Firm Size
(SIZE): Total Assets; Return on Assets (ROA):
Net Income/Total Assets; Leverage (DEBT):
Total Debt/Total Assets; Q: Tobin’s Q.)
RESULTS
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of
restaurant firms. The mean value of classified
board (CB) is 0.5121. This indicates that
51.21% of the sample firms were managed by
classified boards. The descriptive statistics also
show the mean and standard deviation of SIZE
(Mean ¼ $2,935 (in millions); Std. Dev. ¼
$6,052 (in millions)), ROA (Mean ¼ 0.0633;
Std. Dev. ¼ 0.0602), DEBT (Mean ¼ 0.5609;
Std. Dev. ¼ 0.2124), and Q (Mean ¼ 1.4815;
Std. Dev. ¼ 1.1791). For the restaurant firms
with board classification, the descriptive
statistics record SIZE (Mean ¼ $3,139 (in
millions); Std. Dev. ¼ $8,149 (in millions)),
ROA (Mean ¼ 0.0618; Std. Dev. ¼ 0.0673),
DEBT (Mean ¼ 0.5239; Std. Dev. ¼ 0.2283),
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TABLE 3. Descriptive Statistics
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Variables

Mean

Std. Dev.

All (N ¼ 118)
CB
0.5121
0.5018
SIZE
2,935
6,052
ROA
0.0633
0.0602
DEBT
0.5609
0.2124
Q
1.4815
1.1791
Classified board (N ¼ 60)
SIZE
3,139
8,149
ROA
0.0618
0.0673
DEBT
0.5239
0.2283
Q
1.5696
1.4015
Nonclassified board (N ¼ 58)
SIZE
2,720
2,423
ROA
0.0649
0.0523
DEBT
0.5997
0.1886
Q
1.3905
0.8968

Minimum

Maximum

0
194
20.2547
0.1606
0.0818

1
32,989
0.1692
1.1358
7.4054

194
20.2546
0.1606
0.0818

32,989
0.1668
1.1358
7.4054

197
20.1032
0.2270
0.1235

8,834
0.1692
1.0165
3.7733

Note: CB: 1 ¼ Classified board; 0 ¼ Nonclassified board;
SIZE: Total Assets; ROA ¼ Net Income/Total Assets; DEBT: Total
Debt/Total Assets; Tobin’s Q ¼ (MVE þ PS þ LIAB)/TA. (Where,
MVE ¼ Market Value of Equity ¼ Share Price* Number of
Common Stock Outstanding; PS ¼ Preferred Stock ¼ Book
value of the firm’s preferred stock; LIAB ¼ Book Value of
Inventories þ Book Value of Long-term Debt - Short-term
Liability -Short-term Assets; and TA ¼ Total Assets ¼ Book Value
of Total Assets)

and Q (Mean ¼ 1.5696; Std. Dev. ¼ 1.4015).
In the case of restaurant firms with a
nonclassified board, the descriptive statistics
appear as SIZE (Mean ¼ $2,720 (in millions);
Std. Dev. ¼ $2,423 (in millions)), ROA
(Mean ¼ 0.0649; Std. Dev. ¼ 0.0523), DEBT
(Mean ¼ 0.5997; Std. Dev. ¼ 0.1886), and Q
(Mean ¼ 1.3905; Std. Dev. ¼ 0.8968).
Table 4 illustrates the results of the
correlation matrix. Tobin’ s Q was significantly
correlated to SIZE (r ¼ 0.2466; p , .01), ROA
(r ¼ 0.6299; p , .01), and DEBT (r ¼
2 0.3455; p , .01). SIZE and ROA also

showed a significantly positive correlation
(r ¼ 0.3318; p , .01). DEBT and CB had a
negative correlation (r ¼ 20.1791; p , .05).
Table 5 presents the outcome of pooled OLS
regression analysis. The significant attributes
included SIZE (b ¼ 0.1573; p , .05), ROA
(b ¼ 10.6202; p , .01), DEBT (b ¼ 23.3691;
p , .01), and CB*DEBT (b ¼ 1.6403; p , .05).
The F-statistics also confirmed the model
significance ( p , .01). The R-squared value
suggests that the model accounted for approximately 77.44% of variability for the prediction
of firm value. We found support only for the
second hypothesis.
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of this research was to
investigate the effect of board classification on
the value of restaurant firms. This study
proposed two hypotheses:
H1: Classified boards will reduce value
H2: Classified boards will reduce cost of
debt of restaurant firms.
The variable of classified board (CB) did not
report significant results for the first hypothesized models. This indicates that the first
hypothesis was not supported for our sample.
However, the regression output does show that
the statistical significance for the interaction
variable between CB and debt ratio (DEBT). The
coefficient had a positive coefficient; however,
the magnitude of interaction (b ¼ 1.6403) was
smaller than the raw variable of DEBT

TABLE 4. Summary of Correlation Matrix (N ¼ 118)

Q
SIZE
ROA
DEBT
CB

Q

SIZE

ROA

DEBT

CB

1
0.2466**
0.6299**
20.3455**
0.0763

1
0.3318**
0.0664
0.0347

1
20.0015
20.0255

1
20.1791*

1

Note: CB: 1 ¼ Classified board; 0 ¼ Nonclassified board; SIZE: Total Assets; ROA ¼ Net Income/Total Assets; DEBT: Total Debt/Total
Assets; Tobin’s Q ¼ (MVE þ PS þ LIAB)/TA (Where, MVE ¼ Market Value of Equity ¼ Share Price* Number of Common Stock
Outstanding; PS ¼ Preferred Stock ¼ Book value of the firm’s preferred stock; LIAB ¼ Book Value of Inventories þ Book Value of Longterm Debt - Short-term Liability -Short-term Assets; and TA ¼ Total Assets ¼ Book Value of Total Assets), *p , .05, **p , .01.
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TABLE 5. Regression Analysis With Pooled OLS (N ¼ 118)
Study Variables
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Intercept
SIZE
ROA
DEBT
CB
CB*SIZE
CB*ROA
CB*DEBT

Coefficient (t-stat)

VIF

20.2162 (20.74)
0.1573 (2.44)*
10.6202 (7.71)**
23.3691(25.92)**
0.1937(0.50)
20.1146(21.56)
21.4924 (0.87)
1.6403 (2.31)*

4.23
4.14
3.02
1.25
3.67
3.55
2.49

F-statistics ¼ 34.93**; Adjusted R2 ¼ 0.7744.
Note: CB: 1 ¼ Classified board; 0 ¼ Nonclassified board;
SIZE: Total Assets; ROA ¼ Net Income/Total Assets; DEBT: Total
Debt/Total Assets; Tobin’s Q ¼ (MVE þ PS þ LIAB)/TA (MVE ¼
Market Value of Equity ¼ Share Price* Number of Common Stock
Outstanding; PS ¼ Preferred Stock ¼ Book value of the firm’s
preferred stock; LIAB ¼ Book Value of Inventories þ Book Value
of Long-term Debt - Short-term Liability -Short-term Assets; and
TA ¼ Total Assets ¼ Book Value of Total Assets), The dependent
variable in this regression is Tobin’s Q, *p , .05, **p , .01.

(b ¼ 23.3691). However, the summation of
effect magnitudes of DEBT on the firm value of
restaurants was still negative (b ¼ 2 1.7288).
However, it is also important to note that this
negative summation effect was lower for CB
firms than for those that did not have CBs
(b ¼ 2 3.3691) (b ¼ 2 3.3691 þ interaction
coefficient*0 for non-CB).
Falaye (2007) argues that a classified board
performs differently in a certain type of firm;
however, that study analyzed only the case of
firms with large-firm size. Therefore, this
research attempted to investigate the effect of
a classified board on restaurant-firm value
because restaurant firms exhibit relatively
smaller firm size (Guillet & Mattila, 2010). In
order to measure firm value, this study used
Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. By
examining the industry-oriented effect of
board classification, this study presented a
positively significant coefficient on the interaction between a classified board and financial
leverage (DEBT). This indicates that board
classification was not detrimental for restaurant
firm value in this study sample. However,
restaurant firms’ value destruction is mitigated
by lower cost of debt financing due to their
board classification.
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Moreover, this study used panel regression
to analyze the data based on the results of
Guillet and Mattila (2010). The Breusch and
Pagan Lagrangian multiplier tests were used to
select a robust model. This enabled us to
choose between pooled OLS and random
effect models, which incorporate unobserved
effects to estimate robust coefficients (Wooldridge, 2009; Gujarati & Porter, 2009). Pooled
OLS results did not show the statistical
significance. It indicates that the value of
restaurant firms was not predicted well by
using only the CB itself. Moreover, this study
found that SIZE and ROA enhanced a firm’s
value in the case of declassifying the board as
well as the case of DEBT decreasing the
restaurant firm’s value, which is externally
validated in previous studies (e.g., Hsu & Jang,
2009; Koh et al., 2009; Falaye, 2007; Bebchuk
& Cohen, 2005). Financial leverage (DEBT)
interacted with CB, and this also showed a
positive coefficient, even though the magnitude was smaller than DEBT. Chen (2012) and
Harford, Li, et al. (2008) verified that classified
boards reduce the cost of debt by enhancing
capabilities against opportunistic bids. Our
study found this to be true also in the case of
the restaurant industry. Hence, this research
could contribute to hospitality literature by
exploring the effect of board classification on
restaurant industries’ values.
The results of this study could provide an
industry-oriented standard in terms of the
effect of board classification on the value of
restaurant firms. These findings could help
alleviate the conflict between restaurant firms’
shareholders. For instance, in the recent case
of McDonald’s corporation, this study would
support the role of board classification in terms
of lowering a corporation’s debt financing. The
results could help managers persuade shareholders to consider board classification
because it could enable the management to
expand its debt financing. Practitioners and
executives in the restaurant firm can compare
their circumstances and consider the option of
establishing a classified board in the context of
their debt financing needs. For instance, if a
restaurant firm were either heavily dependent
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on debt financing or vulnerable against
opportunistic bids, the shareholders and
board of directors could consider board
classification in order to prevent losing their
value by an opportunistic bid. Shareholders
also could avoid the unnecessary monitoring of
board classification if they were well informed
about the effect of board classification on their
firm’s financial status. This enables restaurant
firms to avoid resource depletion for unnecessary monitoring.
This study is not free of limitations. First,
the sample size was not large because of the
constrained data availability of classified
boards in the restaurant industry from the
RiskMetrics database. If a future study were
performed with a larger sample size, the
outcome would be more robust. Moreover,
the sampled firms are mainly U.S. based.
Therefore, the study results could be limited
in terms of generalizability. Future studies
would need to extend the scope to the
international market such as the European or
Asian market. Finally, future studies could
extend such an analysis of classified boards for
other hospitality industries, such as airline and
lodging firms. The effect of a board of
directors is more likely to appear different
because each hospitality industry has unique
financial characteristics.
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